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LESLIE SALT CO. v. UMT STATES: HAVE MIGRATORY
BIRDS CARRIED THE COMMERCE CLAUSE ACROSS
THE BORDERS OF REASON?
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1972, Congress promulgated the Clean Water Act (CWA),
intending to further restore the purity of the nation's waters.1
Since its inception, the CWA has sought to achieve this purpose by
facilitating the regulation of water integrity. Unfortunately, contro-
versy concerning which "waters" the Act is specifically meant to ap-
ply continues to plague any interpretation of the CWA.
2
The majority of courts give the term "waters" the most expan-
sive definition permissible under the Commerce Clause.3 As a re-
sult, the administrative agencies vested with the power to enforce
the CWA,4 such as the Army Corps of Engineers (Corps), have been
granted broad jurisdictional powers.5 This, in turn, has created ani-
mosity between private property owners and those agencies respon-
sible for enforcing the CWA.6
Leslie Salt Co. v. United States (Leslie Salt V) 7 exemplifies the
controversy concerning the proper scope of the CWA's jurisdiction.
In Leslie Salt IV, the Ninth Circuit expanded the CWA's jurisdiction
when it held that migratory birds' use of an isolated, man-made
pond affected interstate commerce, thus bringing it within the
1. Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 (CWA), Pub. L.
No. 92-500, §§ 101-15, 201-12, 301-18, 401-05, 501-17, 86 Stat. 816 (codified as
amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1972) (amended 1994)).
2. See Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 55 F.3d 1388, 1390 (9th Cir. 1995), cert.
denied sub nom. Cargill Inc. v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 407 (1995) (Leslie Salt IV).
For a discussion of the controversy over the definition of "waters" in the CWA, see
infra notes 52-55 and accompanying text.
3. For a discussion of the expansive definition courts have given the term "wa-
ters," see infra notes 56-58 and accompanying text.
4. For a discussion of the jurisdiction granted to administrative agencies, see
infra note 5 and accompanying text.
5. Hope Babcock, Federal Wetlands Regulatoy Policy, Up to Its Ears in Alligators, 8
PACE ErvrL. L. REv. 307, 318 (1991). The Corps is a branch of the Defense De-
partment involved with projects affecting the nation's waterways. Id. The United
States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is another such agency vested with
the power to enforce the CWA. 33 U.S.C. § 1222(b) (1994).
6. Babcock, supra note 5, at 312.
7. Leslie Salt I, 55 F.3d 1388 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied sub nom. Cargill, Inc.
v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 407 (1995).
(291)
1
Gelb: Leslie Salt Co. v. United States: Have Migratory Birds Carried th
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1997
292 VILLANovA ENVIRONMENTAL LAw JouRNAL [Vol. VIII: p. 291
scope of the Commerce Clause.8 In reaching this conclusion, the
Ninth Circuit addressed whether the petitioner, Cargill Inc., suffi-
ciently proved that the first panel of the Ninth Circuit (Leslie Salt
II), as well as the court's corresponding factual findings, were
"clearly erroneous."9 In determining whether Cargill's claims satis-
fied this standard of review, the second panel of the Ninth Circuit
addressed three issues: (1) whether the preamble to the Corps'
regulations concerning the CWA were substantive rules or merely
interpretive rules;10 (2) whether the Corps' interpretation of the
Act, extending its jurisdiction to habitats used only by migratory
birds, was reasonable; and (3) if the Corps' interpretation was rea-
sonable, whether the CWA's broad grant of jurisdictional powers
exceeded Congress's powers under the Commerce Clause." In Les-
lie Salt IV, the Ninth Circuit, pursuant to the law of the case doc-
trine, held that the regulations were interpretive and, therefore,
not subject to notice and comment requirements. 12 Additionally,
the court found it reasonable for the Corps to extend its jurisdic-
tion to habitats used only by migratory birds and, therefore, the
CWA did not exceed Congress's power under the Commerce
Clause. 13
This Note asserts that the Ninth Circuit correctly held that the
migratory bird rule was a reasonable interpretation of the CWA.14
Nevertheless, in finding the CWA's regulations to be interpretive
rather than substantive, the court overlooked the essence of the
CWA regulations.1 5 Further, the court unconstitutionally extended
Congress's Commerce Clause powers when it permitted the CWA's
8. See id.
9. See id. at 1394. According to the Ninth Circuit, the district court will only
review clearly erroneous factual findings. Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 896 F.2d
354, 357 (9th Cir. 1990) (Leslie Salt fl). The decision of a previous panel of the
circuit court remains intact, unless the appellant can prove the earlier findings of
fact were clearly erroneous. Id.
10. Leslie Salt IV, 55 F.3d at 1393. This issue required resolution because sub-
stantive rules, unlike interpretive rules, are subject to notice and comment require-
ments. Tabb Lakes, Ltd. v. United States, 715 F. Supp. 726, 728 (E.D. Va. 1988),
aff'd, 885 F.2d 866 (4th Cir. 1989).
11. Leslie Salt IV, 55 F.3d at 1394-95.
12. Id. at 1394.
13. Id. at 1395; see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 1-18. For a discussion of the
court's determination that the Corps' jurisdiction can be extended to habitats used
only by migratory birds, see infra notes 135-45 and accompanying text.
14. For a discussion of the reasonableness of the Ninth Circuit's migratory
bird rule, see infra notes 132-46 and accompanying text.
15. For a discussion of the substantive nature of the Corps' regulations, see
infra notes 159-77 and accompanying text.
2
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jurisdiction to extend into an activity having little, if any, effect on
interstate commerce. 16
Section II discusses the pertinent rules and doctrines the Ninth
Circuit employed in its analysis. 17 Additionally, Section II gives a
synopsis of Congress's powers pursuant to the Commerce Clause
and the CWA.18 Section III discusses the facts surrounding Leslie
SaltIV 19 Section IV explains the Ninth Circuit's reasoning in hold-
ing that an isolated, man-made wetland falls within the ambit of the
CWA's jurisdiction. 20 Section V critiques the Ninth Circuit's hold-
ing, concluding that the Ninth Circuit overextended Congress's
enumerated powers under the Commerce Clause. 21 Section VI
concludes by discussing the inherent dangers of granting Congress
seemingly unlimited Commerce Clause powers. 22
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Law of the Case Doctrine
Under the law of the case doctrine, a second panel of an appel-
late court generally will not reconsider questions already consid-
ered by the first panel.23 In Christianson v. Colt Industries Operating
Corp.,2 4 the United States Supreme Court commented that "[a]s
most commonly defined, the doctrine [of the law of the case] posits
that when a court decides upon a rule of law, that decision should
continue to govern the same issues in subsequent stages of the same
16. For a discussion of why the migratory bird rule overextends Congress's
Commerce Clause powers, see infra notes 188-205 and accompanying text.
17. For a discussion of the pertinent doctrines and rules which the Ninth Cir-
cuit used in its analysis, see infra notes 23-75 and accompanying text.
18. For a discussion of Congress's powers under the Commerce Clause and its
powers under the CWA, see infra notes 32-61 and accompanying text.
19. For a discussion of the facts of Leslie Salt IV see infra notes 76-103 and
accompanying text.
20. For a discussion of the Ninth Circuit's holding regarding the scope of the
CWA's jurisdiction, see infra notes 132-46 and accompanying text.
21. For a discussion of why the Ninth Circuit's holding overextends Con-
gress's Commerce Clause powers, see infra notes 188-205 and accompanying text.
22. For a discussion of the inherent dangers in granting Congress seemingly
unlimited powers, see infra notes 207-14 and accompanying text.
23. Kimball v. Callahan, 590 F.2d 768, 771 (9th Cir. 1979). In commenting
on the law of the case doctrine, the Kimball court noted:
[t]his laudable and self-imposed restriction is grounded upon the sound
public policy that litigation must come to an end. An appellate court
cannot efficiently perform its duty to provide expeditious justice to all "if
a question once considered and decided by it were to be litigated anew in
the same case upon any and every subsequent appeal."
Id. (footnote omitted) (quoting White v. Murtha, 377 F.2d 428, 431 (5th Cir.
1967)).
24. 486 U.S. 800 (1987).
1997] 293
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case." 25 The purpose of this doctrine is to promote court efficiency
and judgment finality.26
The law of the case doctrine, however, is not a jurisdictional
limitation.2 7 Rather, it merely expresses the accepted practice of
courts in refusing to reconsider issues which have already been re-
solved.28 Despite this accepted practice, the Supreme Court has
held that courts possess the power to revisit their own prior deci-
sions, or those of any lower court, under any circumstances.2 9 The
Court has stressed, however, that a reviewing court should limit it-
self to revisiting decisions only where: (1) an intervening change in
controlling law has occurred; (2) new or substantially different evi-
dence has surfaced; or (3) the previous disposition has resulted in
clear error and manifest injustice.3 0 Thus, in the absence of ex-
traordinary circumstances, or where injustice would result, the law
of the case doctrine should be followed.31
B. The Plenary Power of Congress Under the Commerce Clause
Pursuant to the Commerce Clause,3 2 Congress alone possesses
the power to regulate interstate commerce.3 3 While Congress's
Commerce Clause powers are plenary, controversy has surfaced
concerning the extent to which Congress may act, under the Com-
25. Id. at 815-16 (quoting Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605, 618 (1983)).
26. Id. at 816. As the Court in Christianson stated, "[ti his rule of practice pro-
motes the finality and efficiency of the judicial process by 'protecting against the
agitation of settled issues."' Id. (quoting IB JAMES WM. MOORE ET. AL., MOORE'S
FEDERAL PRACTMcE 1 0.404[1], 118 (1984)).
27. Alliance for Cannabis Therapeutics v. DEA, 15 F.3d 1131, 1134 (D.C. Cir.
1994); Messenger v. Anderson, 225 U.S. 436, 444 (1912).
28. See Messenger, 225 U.S. at 444.
29. Id
30. Merritt v. Mackey, 932 F.2d 1317, 1320 (9th Cir. 1991); Christianson v.
Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 817 (1987). "[A]s a rule courts should
be loathe to ... [revisit prior decisions] in the absence of extraordinary circum-
stances such as where the initial decision was 'clearly erroneous and would work a
manifest injustice.'" Christianson, 486 U.S. at 817.
31. Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Cop., 486 U.S. 800, 817 (1987). The
Ninth Circuit has held that a district court's factual finding is subject to review only
when it is clearly erroneous. Leslie Salt II, 896 F.2d 354, 357 (9th Cir. 1990). The
law of the case remains, therefore, unless the appellant can prove that previous
findings of facts are clearly erroneous. Id. In Christianson, the Court determined
that a circuit court did not act improperly in revisiting a jurisdictional issue be-
cause the prior decision was "clearly wrong" and would result in manifest injustice.
Christianson, 486 U.S. at 817.
32. Id. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 1-18.
33. Id. l. 3. Clause 3 states "Congress shall have [plower [t]o . . .regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the In-
dian Tribes". Id.
4
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merce Clause, when promulgating laws.3 4 Conflict arises when
Congress asserts jurisdiction over activities not directly involving in-
terstate commerce but rather, merely affecting it.35
During the course of this century, courts have granted broad,
expansive powers to Congress when it promulgates legislation
under the Commerce Clause. 36 In granting these powers, courts
have permitted Congress not only to regulate interstate commerce
but also to regulate those activities affecting it as well.3 7 Wickard v.
Filburn38 is the seminal case construing the scope of the Commerce
Clause. In Wickard, the United States Supreme Court held that
Congress may regulate a local activity so long as the activity exerts a
substantial economic effect on interstate commerce.3 9 Similarly, in
Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States,40 the Court held that even
those activities which are local in origin and destination may be reg-
ulated under the Commerce Clause if they substantially affect inter-
state commerce.
41
34. For a discussion of Congress's plenary power, see infra notes 36-47 and
accompanying text.
35. For further discussion of activities that do not directly involve interstate
commerce, see infra notes 36-47 and accompanying text.
Three types of Commerce Clause issues can arise from congressional legisla-
tion. John A. Leman, Comment, The Birds: Regulation of Isolated Wetlands and the
Limits of the Commerce Clause, 28 U.C. DAvIs L. REv. 1237, 1248 (1995). The issues
surface when: (1) legislation involves broadly phrased laws that Congress restricts
by stating it will only extend them to the limits of the Commerce Clause; (2) laws
that purport to regulate an activity are silent on the Commerce Clause issue; and
(3) there is a congressional finding that a given activity affects interstate com-
merce. Id.
36. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964); Katzen-
bach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 302 (1964); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111
(1942).
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has placed limitations on these powers. Ac-
tivities which fall outside of the Commerce Clause's scope include those activities
that take place entirely within a state. Leman, supra note 35, at nn.175-82. Be-
cause they do not have any effect on other states and generally do not interfere
with governmental power, they fall outside the scope of the Comerce Clause.
37. For a discussion of activities that so not involve interstate commerce but
affect it, see infra notes 38-45 and accompanying text.
38. 217 U.S. 111 (1942).
39. Id. In Wckard, the Supreme Court considered the issue of whether a
farmer who had grown crops for his own consumption interfered with interstate
commerce. Id. at 124-25. The Court held that a farmer's growing of his own wheat
did affect the interstate market when taken in the aggregate with other such deci-
sions. Id. at 128-29.
40. 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
41. Id. In Heart of Atlanta, the Supreme Court addressed a challenge to the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Tide II). Id. The Court determined that the discrimina-
tion of patrons in private hotels had a substantial burden on interstate commerce
and, therefore, was subject to federal jurisdiction. Id. at 258.
5
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Despite the Commerce Clause's broad grant of power, limita-
tions on Congress's jurisdiction exist.42 In Hodel v. Virginia Suiface
Mining & Reclamation Ass'n,43 the Supreme Court found that in or-
der to exercise its Commerce Clause power, Congress must show
that the regulated activity has a "substantial effect" on interstate
commerce. 44 Without this substantial limitation, Justice Rehnquist
commented, the reach of the Commerce Clause would be limit-
less. 45 Nevertheless, congressional regulations are rarely invali-
dated under the substantial effects test.46 As a result, Congress
successfully uses its plenary power to regulate numerous activities,
effectively stretching the scope of its Commerce Clause powers. 47
C. The Clean Water Act
In 1972, pursuant to its Commerce Clause powers, Congress
promulgated the CWA.48 The CWA is a comprehensive statute
designed to "restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and bio-
42. See Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264
(1981).
43. 452 U.S. 264 (1981). See also Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314 (1981) (dis-
cussing scope of Commerce Clause).
44. Hodel, 452 U.S. at 275-83. In the two Hodel cases, the Supreme Court faced
the issue of whether the Surface Mining Act of 1977 (SMA) exceeded the scope of
the Commerce Clause. Hode4 452 U.S. at 314. In the SMA, Congress specifically
stated that the activities and areas the act was intended to regulate directly affected
interstate commerce. Id. In reality, the activity only affected a minor portion of
interstate commerce. Id. at 322. However, because the Supreme Court defers to
congressional findings and, because Congress explicitly found a substantial effect
on interstate commerce, the Supreme Court held that the activity passed the test
and, thus, was valid. Id. at 324.
The Court later reaffirmed the "substantial effect" test in United States v. Lo-
pez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995). The plaintiffs in Lopez challenged the validity of the
Gun-Free School Zone Act of 1990 (GFSZA). Id. at 1626. Under the GFSZA, the
possession of firearms in a designated school zone is deemed a federal crime. Id.
The Supreme Court concluded that in order to determine whether an activity can
be regulated requires an analysis of whether the regulated activity "substantially
affects" interstate commerce. Id. at 1630.
45. Virginia Surface Mining, 452 U.S. at 310 (Rehnquist, J., concurring). Jus-
tice Rehnquist further acknowledged "there may be activities that are so local or
private in nature that they simply may not be in commerce." Id.
46. For further discussion on how the test does not invalidate all activities not
substantially affecting interstate commerce, see infra notes 193-203 and accompa-
nying text.
47. See, e.g., Leslie Salt IV, 55 F.3d 1388, 1395 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied sub
norm. Cargill, Inc. v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 407 (1995) (holding Congress can
regulate seasonal, man-made, isolated ponds because migratory birds using them
potentially had effect on interstate commerce).
48. Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 (CWA), Pub.
L. No. 92-500, §§ 101-15, 201-12, 301-18, 401-05, 501-17, 86 Stat. 816 (codified as
amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1972) (amended 1994)).
6
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logical integrity of the nation's waters." 49 To achieve this goal, Con-
gress expressly prohibits or limits certain activities such as the
discharge of pollutants into a body of water.50 For example, per-
sons who wish to discharge, fill or dredge materials into any body of
water must first obtain a permit from the Corps.51 Although such
restrictions apply to any "navigable water of the United States," the
term "navigable water" is plagued with ambiguity and is a source of
controversy.
The CWA defines "navigable waters" as "waters of the United
States." 52 Although Congress has yet to define the term "waters of
the United States," the Corps continues to use the term in its regu-
lations.53 Adding to the confusion is the question of the proper
49. CWA § 101(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a).
50. Id. Congress defined "pollutant" to include the dumping of any fill. CWA
§ 502(6), 33 U.S.C. § 1362(6). Section 1362(6) states that the term "pollutant"
means "dredged soil, solid waste, incinerator residue, sewage, garbage, sewage
sludge, munitions, chemical wastes, biological materials, radioactive materials,
heat, wrecked or discarded equipment, rock, sand, cellar dirt and industrial, mu-
nicipal, and agricultural waste discharged into water." Id. Congress, however, was
only concerned with the pollution of the nation's water, rather than with all forms
of pollution. Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 700 F. Supp. 476, 482 (N.D. Cal.
1988), rev'd 896 F.2d 354 (9th Cir. 1990) (Leslie Salt 1).
51. Navigation and Navigable Waters, 33 C.F.R. § 326.3(c) (1996). The
Corps' regulations require individuals to obtain a permit before discharging
dredged or fill materials into wetlands or any waters subject to the Corps' jurisdic-
tion. See id. Once the Corps' district engineer determines that a CWA violation
exists, the responsible party must be notified. Id. If the violation involves a project
that is not complete, a cease and desist order may be issued prohibiting any future
work until the matter is resolved. Id. at § 326.3(c)(1). If the project is complete,
however, the engineer must notify the responsible party, obtain additional infor-
mation if needed, and determine after consultation with different agencies
whether corrective measures are necessary. Id. at §§ 326.3(c)(2), 326.3(c)(3).
Once corrective measures have been completed, the district engineer must accept
an after-the-fact permit application, unless granting the application would be inap-
propriate. Id. at 326.3(e).
52. CWA § 502(7), 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7). The Supreme Court stated that the
CWA's definition of navigable waters as "waters of the United States" proves the
term "navigable," as used in the act, is of little import. United States v. Riverside
Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 133 (1985).
53. See 33 C.F.R. § 328. Section 328.3 provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
(a) The term waters of the United States means
(1) All waters which are currently used, or were used in the past, or
may be susceptible to use in interstate or foreign commerce, in-
cluding all waters which are subject to the ebb and flow of the
tide ...
(3) All other waters such as intrastate lakes, rivers, streams (includ-
ing intermittent streams), mudflats, sandflats, wetlands, sloughs,
prairies potholes, wet meadows, playa lakes, or natural ponds,
the use, degradation or destruction of which could affect inter-
state or foreign commerce including any such waters:
(i) Which are or could be used by interstate or foreign travel-
ers for recreational or other purposes; or
2971997]
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scope of the term "navigable waters."5 4 The prevailing opinion is
that "Congress intended the CWA to assert 'federal jurisdiction
over the nation's waters to the maximum extent permissible under
the Commerce Clause of the Constitution.' 55 Moreover, courts
have held that in order to give the federal government the maxi-
mum amount ofjurisdiction permitted, the term "navigable waters"
(ii) From which fish or shellfish are or could be taken and sold
in interstate or foreign commerce; or
(iii) Which are used or could be used for industrial purpose by
industries in interstate commerce...
(7) Wetlands adjacent to waters (other than waters that are themselves
wetlands) identified in paragraphs (a) (1) through (6) of this
section....
(b) The term wetlands means those areas that are inundated or satu-
rated by surface or ground water at a frequency and duration
sufficient to support, and that under normal circumstances do
support, a prevalence of vegetation typically adapted for life in
saturated soil conditions. Wetlands generally include swamps,
marshes, bogs, and similar areas.
(c) The term "adjacent" means bordering, contiguous, or neighbor-
ing. Wetlands separated from other waters of the United States
by man-made dikes or barriers, natural river berms, beach dunes
and the like are "adjacent wetlands."
(f) The term "tidal waters" means those waters that rise and fall in a
predictable and measurable rhythm or cycle due to the gravita-
tional pulls of the moon and sun. Tidal waters end where the
rise and fall of the water surface can no longer be practically
measured in a predictable rhythm due to masking by hydrologic,
wind, or other effects.
Id.
54. H.R. REP. No. 92-911 (1972); S. CONF. REP. No. 92-1236 (1972) reprinted
in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3776.
55. See, e.g., Quivira Mining Co. v. EPA, 765 F.2d 126, 129-30 (10th Cir. 1985)
(holding dry ditch, which sometimes became flooded and ran into a navigable
stream, subject to CWAjurisdiction because Congress intended CWA to cover as
many waters as possible). See also United States v. Tull, 769 F.2d 182, 184 (4th Cir.
1985) (holding legislative history shows Congress intended CWA to reach very lim-
its of Commerce Clause); United States v. Byrd, 609 F.2d 1204, 1209 (7th Cir.
1979) (holding Congress intended CWA to be given broadest meaning permissible
under Constitution); United States v. Akers, 651 F. Supp. 320 (E.D. Cal. 1987)
(finding Congress intended definition of "waters of the United States" to cover
maximum area possible under Commerce Clause); Leslie Salt Co. v. Froehlke, 403
F. Supp. 1292 (N.D. Cal. 1974), rev'd on other grounds, 578 F.2d 742 (9th Cir. 1978)
(holding jurisdictional terms of Act are to be given broadest interpretation under
Commerce Clause).
The definition of "water" further supports this proposition. See Stoeco Dev.,
Ltd. v. Department of the Army Corps of Eng'rs, 701 F. Supp. 1075 (D.N.J. 1988).
The court in Stoeco Development rationalized that in adopting such a broad defini-
tion, Congress evidently intended to repudiate limits that had been placed on ear-
lier federal regulations by other water pollution control statutes. Id. at 1078.
Additionally, the court concluded that Congress intended to exercise its powers
under the Commerce Clause in order to regulate some waters that would not be
deemed navigable under classic notions of the term. Id. at 1079.
8
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should be given the broadest interpretation possible.56 Recently,
courts have employed this broad definition, holding "waters" can
now be man-made, seasonal and a result of government activity.
5 7
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has held that the Corps can in-
voke jurisdiction over wetlands that are merely adjacent to other
waters.58
One issue on which the courts do not agree, however, is
whether the Corps has jurisdiction over isolated wetlands-those
wetlands not adjacent to other waters.5 9 Despite this disagreement,
the Supreme Court has yet to address the issue.60 Because isolated
wetlands have no connection to other waters and, thus, are intra-
state, in order for the Corps to assert jurisdiction over the property,
some other connection to interstate commerce must be asserted.
61
56. See, e.g., United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121,
133 (1985) (holding "Congress chose to define the waters covered by the act
broadly").
57. See Leslie Salt , 700 F. Supp. 476 (N.D. Cal. 1988), rev'd, 896 F.2d 354 (9th
Cir. 1990); Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 820 F. Supp. 478 (N.D. Cal. 1992) (Les-
lie Salt Il1).
58. Riverside, 474 U.S. at 134. In Riverside, the Supreme Court held that while
the Corps' jurisdiction should not extend to wetland areas possessing some abnor-
mal wetland vegetation, it would not be unreasonable, given the extent of congres-
sional concern for protection of water quality and aquatic ecosystems, for the
Corps to exercise jurisdiction over these wetlands if they are adjacent to other
waters. Id. The Court rationalized that because wetlands which are adjacent to
navigable waters "do as a general matter play a key role in protecting and enhanc-
ing water quality," wetlands should be subject to the Corps' jurisdiction. Id. See
Protection of Environment, 40 C.F.R. § 230.3(t) (7) (1996) (stating adjacent wet-
lands come within scope of commerce power by virtue of their connection with
other waters which are either interstate or connected to interstate commerce).
59. Leman, supra note 35, at n.163. Isolated wetlands are wetlands not associ-
ated with another body of water. 40 C.F.R. § 230.3(t) (7). The Corps defines iso-
lated wetlands as wetlands that are intrastate and that when used or damaged
could affect interstate commerce. Navigation and Navigable Waters, 33 C.F.R.
§ 328.3(t) (7) (1996).
60. In Riverside, the Supreme Court expressly declined to address whether the
federal government may regulate isolated wetlands. Riverside, 474 U.S. at 131. The
Court commented: "[w]e are not called upon to address the question of the au-
thority of the Corps to regulate discharges of fill material into wetlands that are
not adjacent to bodies of open water .... and we do not express any opinion on
that question." Id. at n.8.
61. See 40 C.F.R. § 230.3(s) (3). In Hoffman Homes, Inc. v. EPA, 999 F.2d 256,
260 (7th Cir. 1993), the Seventh Circuit was presented with the issue of whether
wetlands must have an actual effect on interstate commerce, or whether showing a
potential effect would suffice to connect waters to interstate commerce in order
for the Corps to assert jurisdiction. Id. The Seventh Circuit analyzed the regula-
tions stating that the CWA explicitly forbids "degradation or destruction" of intra-
state wetlands when such actions "could affect" interstate commerce. Id. (emphasis
added). In so doing, the court concluded that the word "could" is crucial. Id. at
260-61. Because the Corps used the word "could," the court in Hoffman Homes
found that the regulation covers waters whose connection to interstate commerce
1997]
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One such method suggested for creating a nexus between isolated
wetlands and interstate commerce is to apply the migratory bird
rule.
D. The Migratory Bird Rule
The migratory bird rule was first advanced in 1985.62 In that
year, the Corps wrote a memorandum listing seven standards by
which to judge whether a connection to interstate commerce war-
ranted exercising the Corps' jurisdiction under the CWA. 63 One
standard permits the Corps to assert jurisdiction over "[w]aters
which are used or could be used as habitat by other migratory birds
crossing state lines."64 A second memorandum was later issued stat-
ing that "all waterbodies which are or reasonably could be used by
migratory birds are waters of the United States and should be regu-
lated as such."6 5 Subsequent to including the language "all water-
may be potential rather than actual, as well as minimal as opposed to substantial.
Id. at 261.
62. Tabb Lakes, Ltd. v. United States, 715 F. Supp. 726, 728 (E.D. Va. 1988),
aff'd, 885 F.2d 866 (4th Cir. 1989).
63. Id. The memorandum was issued by Brigadier General Patrick J. Kelly,
Deputy Director of Civil Works for the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Washington,
D.C.
64. Id.
65. Id. Much of the controversy surrounding these regulations exists because
the rules were not subject to notice and public comment. Id Before a rule is
promulgated, section 553 of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) requires an
agency to give notice to the public regarding the proposed rule and to give the
public an opportunity to respond. Id. An exception to the notice and comment
requirements applies, however, to interpretive rules. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (3) (A)
(1994). Section 553 provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
(b) General notice of proposed rule making shall be published in the
Federal Register, unless persons subject thereto are named and
either personally served or otherwise have actual notice thereof in
accordance with law. The notice shall include-
(1) a statement of the time, place, and nature of public rule making
proceedings;
(2) reference to the legal authority under which the rule is pro-
posed; and
(3) either the terms or substance of the proposed rule or a descrip-
tion of the subjects and issues involved.
Except when notice or hearing is required by statute, this subsection
does not apply-
(A) to interpretative rules, general statements of policy, or rules of
agency organization, procedure, or practice; or
(B) when the agency for good cause finds (and incorporates the finding
and a brief statement of reasons therefor in the rules issued) that
notice and public procedure thereon are impracticable, unneces-
sary, or contrary to the public interest.
(c) After notice required by this section, the agency shall give interested
persons an opportunity to participate in the rule making through
10
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bodies which could be used by migratory birds" in its regulations,
the Corps began asserting jurisdiction over waters which were, or
could be, a habitat for migratory birds.66 Consequently, because
the CWA is applied to isolated wetlands whose only connection to
interstate commerce is its use by migratory birds, when cases involv-
ing the migratory bird rule come before a court, the issue ad-
dressed usually revolves around whether application of the CWA
exceeds Congress's Commerce Clause powers.6 7
The majority of courts find the Commerce Clause powers, and
thus the CWA, broad enough to permit extension of the Corps'
jurisdiction to isolated waters which may prove to be a habitat for
migratory birds.68 For example, in Hoffman Homes, Inc. v. EPA,69
the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that
it was reasonable to allow migratory birds to be the crucial connec-
submission of written data, views, or arguments with or without op-
portunity for oral presentation...
Id.
The question that arises is whether the migratory bird rule is interpretive, in
which case the Corps is not required to comply with the notice and comment re-
quirements, or whether the rule is substantive, in which case the Corps must com-
ply with the requirements. Tabb Lakes, 715 F. Supp. at 728. Substantive rules are
those "which grant rights, impose obligations, or produce other significant effects
on public interests, or which effect a change in existing law or policy." Id. at 728.
See also Alcaraz v. Block, 746 F.2d 593, 613 (9th Cir. 1984) (defining "substantive
rules"). Interpretive rules, on the other hand, "are those which merely clarify or
explain existing law or regulations, are essentially... instructional, and do not
have the full force and effect of a substantive rule but are in the form of an expla-
nation of particular terms." Tabb Lakes, 715 F. Supp. at 728. See also Alcaraz, 746
F.2d at 613 (emphasizing importance of making distinction between substantive
and interpretive rules). The task of determining whether a regulation is a substan-
tive or an interpretive rule must be very fact specific. Tabb Lakes, 715 F. Supp. at
728.
66. See Leslie Salt II, 896 F.2d 354, 360 (9th Cir. 1990), affld in part, 55 F.3d
1388 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied sub nom. Cargill, Inc. v. United States, 116 S. Ct.
407 (1995) (finding Commerce Clause power, and thus the CWA, broad enough
to extend Corps' jurisdiction to local waters which may provide habitat to migra-
tory birds and endangered species).
67. See id. (remanding to district court for determination of whether it is rea-
sonable for Corps' jurisdiction to rest on fact that migratory birds and endangered
species may use the waters as a habitat).
68. See Brown v. Anderson, 202 F. Supp. 96, 103 (D. Alaska 1962). This case
was the first to hold that congressional power over wildlife stems from the inter-
state movement of persons utilizing or studying wildlife. See id. See also Hodel v.
Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 282 n.21 (1981)
(commenting, "we agree with the lower federal courts that have uniformly found
the power conferred by the Commerce Clause broad enough to permit congres-
sional regulation of activities causing air or water pollution, or other environmen-
tal hazards that may have effect in more than one State"). Id. at 282.
69. 999 F.2d 256 (7th Cir. 1993).
19971
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tion between isolated wetlands and interstate commerce. 70 In ratio-
nalizing its holding, the court correlated the presence of migratory
birds with the people who come to observe them in their natural
habitat, finding a connection with interstate commerce. 71 The
court noted that millions of people throughout America spend bil-
lions of dollars trapping, hunting and observing these birds. 72
From this, the Seventh Circuit concluded that the destruction of
the migratory birds' habitat would adversely affect interstate com-
merce because fewer people would travel across state lines to ob-
serve these birds.73 Thus, the cumulative loss caused by the
destruction of wetlands could potentially prove to be a significant
burden on interstate travelers. 74 Until the Supreme Court ad-
dresses the scope of the migratory bird rule, however, the contro-
versy will continue to plague circuit courts. 75
III. FACTS
A. The Property
The dispute in Leslie Salt centered around the Newark Coyote
property, an undeveloped, 153 acre tract of land.76 When the case
first came before the courts, Leslie Salt, a salt manufacturer, owned
the property; Cargill, Inc. subsequently acquired the property.77
70. Id at 261. See also Reuth v. EPA, 13 F.3d 227, 231 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding
"one test for whether the wetland affects interstate commerce is whether migratory
birds use the wetland").
71. Hoffman Homes, 999 F.2d at 261.
72. Id. See also Palila v. Hawaii Dep't of Land & Natural Resources, 471 F.
Supp. 985, 995 (D. Haw. 1979), aff'd, 639 F.2d 495 (9th Cir. 1981) (commenting
that national program to protect wildlife "preserves the possibilities of interstate
commerce in these species and of interstate movement of persons, such as amateur
students of nature or professional scientists who come to a state to observe and
study these species").
73. Hoffman Homes, 999 F.2d at 261.
74. Id.
75. The Tenth Circuit has also addressed the migratory bird rule. Utah v.
Marsh, 740 F.2d 799 (10th Cir. 1984). The Tenth Circuit determined that the
Commerce Clause reached a lake located entirely within a state which was used as
a flyaway for migratory birds. Id. at 804. The lake in Marsh, however, was used not
only by migratory birds, but also by a commercial fishery which sold its products
out of state. Id. at 803. It is unclear, therefore, whether the Tenth Circuit would
have reached the same conclusion in the absence of the transportation of fish
from out of state. See id. at 804-05.
76. Leslie Salt 1, 896 F.2d 354, 355 (9th Cir. 1990). This land lies south of San
Francisco and approximately one quarter mile from Newark Slough, a tidal arm of
the San Francisco Bay. Id. Additionally, the Newark Coyote land lies adjacent to
San Francisco National Wildlife Refuge. Id.
77. Leslie Saltl V, 55 F.3d 1388, 1390 (9th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Cargill, Inc.
v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 407 (1995).
12
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Although originally a pastureland,78 Leslie Salt's predecessors built
salt manufacturing facilities on the property in order to crystallize
salt.79 While constructing the facilities, the previous owners exca-
vated pits on one parcel of the property and created large, shallow,
water-tight basins on 'the other parcels.80
In 1959, Leslie Salt discontinued its manufacturing of salt.81
Nevertheless, the pits and basins remained.8 2 Each year thereafter,
during California's annual rainy season, the pits and crystallizers
temporarily filled with water, becoming ponds.83 Although the
water accumulation occurred seasonally, the ponds remained long
enough to support aquatic life.8 4 This situation continued until
1983 when the EPA ordered Leslie Salt to plow the property in or-
der to remedy an air pollution problem.85 The plowing loosened
the soil, creating furrows.8 6 In turn, these furrows created an envi-
ronment hospitable to the growth of plant life.8 7
In addition to the plowing, the government substantially al-
tered the physical configuration of the property.88 Along with the
ditches, road beds and culverts leading to a nearby water source,
the government constructed roads and sewers on the property.8 9
78. Leslie Salt I, 700 F. Supp. 476, 479 (N.D. Cal. 1988), rev'd, 896 F.2d 354
(9th Cir. 1990). The land in question had been used as grazing and pastureland
for livestock. Id.
79. Id. The salt manufacturing facilities included a railroad spur, salt refining
plant and other related buildings. Id. at 479-80.
80. Id. at 480. The process for crystallizing salt on the Newark Coyote prop-
erty began by pumping saturated salt brine into crystalizers. Id. The salt then
precipitated and settled to the bottom of the pits, and the remaining liquid was
drawn off. Id. After the liquid was drawn off, large mechanical harvesters ran
across the floor of crystalizers. Id. After the salt was removed, the crystalizers were
then drained, releveled and recompacted. Id.
81. Id. Leslie Salt discontinued its manufacturing of salt because the process
proved uneconomical. Id.
82. Leslie Salt IV, 55 F.3d at 1390.
83. Id. at 1391.
84. Leslie Salt II, 896 F.2d 354, 355 (9th Cir. 1990).
85. Leslie Salt , 700 F. Supp. 476, 480 (N.D. Cal. 1988), rev'd, 896 F.2d 354
(9th Cir. 1990). Leslie Salt had to plow the property because barren crystalizers
were producing dust. Id. Leslie Salt was cited for air pollution violations, and in
an attempt to solve the dust problem, it plowed the property in 1983 and 1985. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. In the early 1980's, the Eastbay Dischargers Authority constructed a
large sewer line across the property. Id. As a result of the construction, the natural
conditions of the land were disturbed and fill and inundations were left. Id. More-
over, the California highway authority (Caltran) constructed Highway 84 across
the northern section of the property, further disrupting the natural environment.
Id.
1997]
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The government then breached a levy and destroyed a tidegate
which had prevented the tidal backflow from reaching the
property.90
As a result of this human intervention, the property began to
foster natural developments. 91 Specifically, the tidewater reached
the edges of the property, creating an environment very similar to
those of wetlands. 92 Furthermore, the ponding of the crystallizers
and the pits attracted migratory birds, as well as some endangered
species, to this man-made habitat.93
B. Intervention By the Army Corps of Engineers
In 1985, Leslie Salt intended to drain the land by building a
feeder ditch and siltation pond on a parcel of its land.94 In re-
sponse to this anticipated action, the Corps issued a cease and de-
sist order pursuant to its CWA jurisdiction.95 The Corps claimed
Leslie Salt violated the CWA by discharging fill, a pollutant, into the
waters of the United States.96 In 1987, the Corps issued a second
cease and desist order to prevent Leslie Salt from placing fill in
another parcel of land.97
Leslie Salt subsequently filed a lawsuit challenging the Corps'
assertion of jurisdiction.98 The Corps countersued, contending
that it had jurisdiction over a majority of the property.99 The Dis-
trict Court for the Northern District of California found in favor of
Leslie Salt, and the United States appealed for a determination of
whether the Corps had jurisdiction over the property.100 The Court
90. Leslie Salt 1, 896 F.2d 354, 356 (9th Cir. 1990).
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Leslie Salt IV, 55 F.3d 1388, 1390 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied sub nom. Car-
gill, Inc. v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 407 (1995). The evidence summarized in the
United States' Memorandum on Remand states that some 55 species of migratory
birds use seasonally ponded areas as habitat. Id.
94. Leslie Salt II, 896 F.2d at 356.
95. Id. For further discussion of the Corps' procedures, see supra note 52.
96. Leslie Salt , 896 F.2d at 356. The Corps claimed that Leslie violated sec-
tion 301(a) of the CWA which provides "'[e]xcept as in compliance with this sec-
tion and section[ ] . . .1344 of this title, the discharge of any pollutant by any
person shall be unlawful.'" Id. at 356 n.3.
97. Id. at 356. The Corps issued the second cease and desist order in re-
sponse to Leslie Salt's attempt to block a culvert connecting its property to the
Newark Slough. Id.
98. Leslie Salt I, 700 F. Supp. 476, 481 (N.D. Cal. 1988), rev'd, 896 F.2d 354
(9th Cir. 1990).
99. Id.
100. Leslie Salt II, 896 F.2d at 355. The district court held that the Corps did
not have jurisdiction over the property under the CWA, as it was not "water of the
14
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of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded, finding
the Corps did have jurisdiction over the land pursuant to the
CWA.' 0 1 On remand, the district court entered judgment against
Leslie Salt but stipulated that Cargill could file an appeal.' 0 2 The
Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment on appeal.103
IV. LESLIE SALT CO. V. UNITED STA TES
A. The Law of the Case Doctrine
On appeal, Cargill began by attacking the law of the case doc-
trine on the ground that the rule did not apply.'04 Cargill sought
reversal of the first panel of the Ninth Circuit's determination (Les-
lie Salt II) which held that the Corps' jurisdiction was sufficiently
broad to encompass isolated waters used only by migratory birds.10 5
Furthermore, Cargill contended that the Ninth Circuit should not
apply the law of the case doctrine because the Leslie Salt II court
upheld the migratory bird rule with a "bare conclusion" and little
discussion. 106
In rejecting this first argument, the Ninth Circuit analyzed the
law of the case doctrine and its application to the facts.10 7 In Leslie
Salt X, the Ninth Circuit noted that in Leslie Salt H the first panel of
the Ninth Circuit determined that "'[t]he [C]ommerce [C]lause
power, and thus the Clean Water Act, is broad enough to extend
the Corps' jurisdiction to local waters which may provide habitat to
migratory birds and endangered species.'" l08 In Leslie Salt I, the
United States" within the meaning of the CWA or corresponding regulations. Les-
lie Salt I, 700 F. Supp. at 484-89. The district court found that the property was
neither "tidal water," "other waters," or "wetland." Id. For a discussion of these
terms, see supra note 53.
101. Leslie Salt II, 896 F.2d at 361. The court held that contrary to the holding
in Leslie Salt I, the Corps did have jurisdiction under the CWA. Id. The court
further determined that such jurisdiction extends to property which becomes
aquatic as a result of government action and that "other waters" within the Corps'
CWAjurisdiction includes both artificial and natural formations. Id. at 354. The
court remanded the case, however, for a determination of what portions of the
property correctly fell within the Corps' jurisdiction. Id. at 361.
102. Leslie Salt I, 700 F. Supp. at 482. The court held that the former crystal-
izers and pits on property have sufficient ties to interstate commerce so as to fall
under the CWA's jurisdiction as "other waters of the United States." Id. at 480.
103. Leslie Salt IV, 55 F.3d 1388, 1389 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied sub nom.
Cargill, Inc. v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 407 (1995).
104. Id. at 1392. For a discussion of the law of the case doctrine, see supra
notes 23-31 and accompanying text.
105. Leslie Salt IV, 55 F.3d at 1392.
106. IML
107. Id.
108. Id.
1997]
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Ninth Circuit remanded the case to the district court solely to de-
termine whether the property in question had sufficient ties to in-
terstate commerce, and not to determine the validity of the
migratory bird rule.10 9 Therefore, the appellate court stated it
would review only those factual issues decided upon remand; specif-
ically, whether the Cargill property was sufficiently connected to in-
terstate commerce so as to fall within the CWA's jurisdictional
powers.' 10
The Ninth Circuit rejected Cargill's argument that the court
should not apply the law of the case doctrine.1 ' First, the court
found that although the Leslie Salt II court's discussion of the migra-
tory bird rule was minimal, it nevertheless addressed the issue.11 2
In fact, the Leslie Salt II court addressed the migratory bird rule in a
distinct part of the opinion and supported its holding with citations
and references to pertinent case law. l"3 In further support of its
holding on this issue, the Leslie Salt IV court cited the Supreme
Court's dicta in Christianson v. Colt Industries Operating Corp.,'1 4 stat-
ing "the law of the case turns on whether a court previously 'de-
cide [d] upon a rule of law' . . . not on whether, or how well, it
explained the decision." 1 5
Notwithstanding the fact that most courts usually apply the law
of the case as a rule, the Ninth Circuit stated it would reconsider
decided questions if: (1) an intervening change of controlling au-
thority exists; (2) new evidence has surfaced; or (3) the previous
disposition was clearly erroneous and upholding it would result in
109. Id. The court noted that "this court's review should generally be limited
to the issues decided on remand - the property's specific connections to interstate
commerce due to migratory bird use." Id.
110. Leslie Salt rV, 55 F.3d at 1392.
111. Id
112. Id. The court admits that "a more detailed explanation for such a signifi-
cant holding might have been more illuminating." ML.
113. Id. In Leslie Salt II, Judge Rymer, in a dissenting opinion, challenged the
holding of the majority on the basis of its analysis of the migratory bird rule. Leslie
Salt II, 896 F.2d 354, 356 (9th Cir. 1990). The Leslie Salt IV court stated that the
existence of Judge Rymer's dissent proves the court adequately considered the va-
lidity of the migratory bird rule. Leslie Salt IV, 55 F.3d at 1392.
114. 486 U.S. 800 (1987). For a discussion of Christianson, see supra notes 24-
26, 30-31.
115. Id. at 817. Additionally, the Ninth Circuit further rejected the adequacy
argument, stating that "even summarily treated issues become the law of the case."
Leslie Salt IV, 55 F.3d at 1392 (citing Alliance for Cannabis Therapeutics v. DEA, 15
F.3d 1131, 1135 (D.C. Cir. 1994)). Furthermore, the court has followed the law of
the case even when the prior court's holding has been "cryptic and somewhat am-
biguous." Id. (citing Hanna Boys Ctr. v. Miller, 853 F.2d 682, 687 (9th Cir. 1988)).
16
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manifest injustice.'1 6 Cargill premised its arguments on the third
prong of the court's test. 117 They asserted that the Leslie Salt II
court's decision was clearly erroneous and resulted in manifest in-
justice.' 8 The second panel of the Ninth Circuit responded by stat-
ing it would revisit the issues addressed in Leslie Salt II only to the
extent necessary to determine whether the matters resolved in the
earlier case should be reconsidered.'1 9 Additionally, because the
law of the case applied to these claims, the second panel ruled that
in order to find the migratory bird rule invalid, Cargill must show
that the Leslie Salt II court was clearly erroneous in approving the
migratory bird rule.1 20
B. Cargill's Challenge to the Validity of the Corps' Regulations
Cargill also contended that the Corps' regulations should not
be used as a predicate for jurisdiction because the preamble to its
1986 CWA regulations promulgated a rule that was not subject to
notice and comment. 12 1 Cargill noted that the Corps cited the reg-
ulation's preamble stating "waters of the United States" also in-
cludes waters which "are or would be used as habitat by other
migratory birds [crossing] state lines."12 2 The Corps asserted juris-
diction over Cargill's property based on this proclamation. 23
116. Leslie Salt IV, 55 F.3d at 1393. For further discussion of the law of the
case doctrine, see supra notes 23-31 and accompanying text.
117. Leslie Salt IV, 55 F.3d at 1393. For a discussion of the third prong of the
court's test, see supra note 30 and accompanying text.
118. Leslie Salt IV 55 F.3d at 1393.
119. Id. The Ninth Circuit will only reconsider matters if it finds that the first
panel's holding was clearly erroneous. Id.
120. Id. The court noted that Cargill must not only show that the decision in
Leslie Salt IIwas wrong, but rather, that the court was clearly wrong. Id. For further
discussion of the Ninth Circuit's standard of review in Leslie Salt II, see supra note 9
and accompanying text.
121. Leslie Salt IV, 55 F.3d at 1393. Although the Leslie Salt II court did not
expressly address this claim in its opinion, the second panel of the Ninth Circuit
noted that the Leslie Salt II court was aware of this argument and the cases on
which Cargill relied. Id. The court then pointed out that the " 'law of the case
applies to 'issues decided explicitly or by necessary implication in this court's previ-
ous disposition.'" Id. (quoting Hanna Boys Ctr. v. Miller, 853 F.2d 682, 685 (9th
Cir. 1988)). The court reasoned that the Leslie Salt II court's holding that migra-
tory bird use could form a sufficient connection to interstate commerce, impliedly
rejects Cargill's argument that the rule was invalid because it was not subject to
notice and comment as required by the APA. Id.
122. Id. at 1394 (quoting Final Rule for Regulatory Programs of the Corps of
Engineers, 51 Fed. Reg. 41,217 (1986)).
123. Id. The Corps applied the regulations when concluding Cargill's prop-
erty fell within "waters of the United States" and thus provided jurisdiction under
the CWA. Id.
1997] 307
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The merit of Cargill's claim depended upon whether the mi-
gratory bird example in the preamble was an interpretive or sub-
stantive rule. 124 The Ninth Circuit stated that an interpretive rule
"is one that merely explains 'what the administrative officer thinks
the statute or regulation means,'" whereas a substantive rule is one
imposing "'general, extra-statutory obligations pursuant to author-
ity properly delegated by the legislature."' 125 The second panel of
the Ninth Circuit agreed with the United States, finding the rule
merely interpretive and, thus, not subject to notice and com-
ment.126 The court agreed with the appellee's contention, and the
Leslie Salt II court's finding that the migratory bird example's pur-
pose was to set forth the Corps' understanding of the term "waters
of the United States." 12 7 In support of this finding, the Court cited
Hoffman Homes, Inc. v. EPA,128 in which the Seventh Circuit inter-
preted the term "other waters" to include waters used by migratory
birds. 129 The Ninth Circuit analogized Hoffman Homes to the in-
stant case, concluding the migratory bird example could also be
viewed as an interpretive tool.13 Based on this analysis, and in light
of the "clearly erroneous" standard of review, the court found the
regulation's preamble to be merely interpretive and, therefore, de-
clined to revisit the issue.15 1
C. Cargill's Challenge to the Reasonableness of the Migratory
Bird Rule
Cargill also challenged the reasonableness of the Leslie Salt II
court's holding that "the CWA is broad enough to extend the
Corps' jurisdiction to local waters which may provide habitat to mi-
gratory birds."13 2 Cargill's argument rested upon the issue of
whether the regulation's example of waters "' [w] hich are or would
be used as habitat by other migratory birds which cross state lines"'
124. Id. at 1393.
125. Id For a further discussion of substantive and interpretive rules, see in-
fra notes 159-77 and accompanying text.
126. Leslie Salt IV, 55 F.3d at 1394. The court noted that since it is plausible to
find that the preamble is an interpretive rule, Leslie Salt II cannot be deemed
clearly erroneous on this point. Id.
127. Id. at 1393.
128. 99 F.2d 256 (7th Cir. 1993). For a discussion of Hoffman Homes, see supra
notes 69-74 and accompanying text.
129. Leslie Salt IV, 55 F.3d at 1393-94.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. Cargill attempted to relitigate the Leslie Salt II court's holding on the
migratory bird rule. Id.
18
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is a reasonable interpretation of the phrase "waters of the United
States."' 33 The court determined that the reasonableness of the
Corps' interpretation must be judged in light of the CWA's plain
language, policies and legislative history.'3
The CWA's plain language led the Ninth Circuit to conclude
that Congress intended the CWA to have a broad purpose and ef-
fect.135 The court pointed to CWA sections 1251 (a) (2) and
1343(c) (1), which note that one of Congress's goals is to protect
and consider "the effect of disposal of pollutants on ... fish, shell-
fish and wildlife."' 3 6 While the court acknowledged that the lan-
guage never mentions isolated waters used by migratory birds, 3 7 it
nevertheless concluded that the policy set forth in the legislative
history offsets the lack of specific language. 138 The court stated that
the legislative history revealed Congress's intent to "extend [the
Clean Water] Act jurisdiction over waters of the United States to
the maximum extent possible under the Commerce Clause."13 9
The court bolstered support for its finding by citing a similar hold-
ing in a recent Seventh Circuit decision. 140
Additionally, the court found support in the Supreme Court's
analysis of the CWA.141 In United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes,
Inc.,' 42 the Supreme Court held that it was reasonable for the Corps
to exercise jurisdiction over wetlands adjacent to other waters. 143
133. Id. Commenting on this issue, the court noted that "[a]n agency's con-
struction of a statute it is charged with enforcing is entitled to deference if it is
reasonable and not in conflict with the expressed intent of Congress." Id. (quoting
United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 131 (1985)).
134. Leslie Salt IV, 55 F.3d at 1394.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. See id. The court concluded that since the policy of the CWA is to pro-
tect wildlife, it could plausibly be read to cover isolated waters used by migratory
birds. Id.
139. Leslie Salt IV, 55 F.3d 1388, 1395 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied sub nom.
Cargill, Inc. v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 407 (1995) (citing S. REP. No. 92-1236
(1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.CA.N. 3776).
140. Id. (quoting Rueth v. EPA, 13 F.3d 227, 231 (7th Cir. 1993)).
141. Id.
142. 474 U.S. 121 (1985). For further discussion of Riverside, see supra notes
56, 58, 60.
143. Riverside, 474 U.S. at 121; Leslie Salt IV, 55 F.3d at 1395. In Riverside, the
court held that "wetlands... may function as integral parts of the aquatic environ-
ment even when the moisture creating the wetlands does not find its source in the
adjacent bodies of water." Riverside 474 U.S. at 135. Further, "adjacent wetlands
may 'serve significant natural biological functions, including food chain produc-
tion, general habitat, and nesting, spawning, rearing, and resting sites for aquatic
... species'") Id. at 134-35 (quoting Navigation and Navigable Waters, 33 C.F.R. §
320.4(b) (2) (i) (1996)).
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Although the Supreme Court never mentioned isolated, seasonal
ponds in Riverside, the Ninth Circuit analogized the wetlands in Riv-
erside to the isolated ponds in the present case. 144 The court held
that, like wetlands, seasonal ponds "may have a connection to the
aquatic ecosystem in their role as habitat for migratory birds."145 In
light of the broad purposes of the CWA, its legislative history and
relevant case law, the court held that the Leslie Salt II court's hold-
ing regarding the reasonableness of the migratory bird rule was not
clearly erroneous.1 46 Thus, the court refused to revisit the issue.
D. Cargill's Challenge to the Constitutionality of the Migratory
Bird Rule
Lastly, Cargill claimed that even if the migratory bird rule was
reasonable, it exceeded Congress's Commerce Clause powers.1 47
Cargill argued that the Ninth Circuit should reverse the Leslie Salt II
court's holding that "[t]he Commerce Clause power ... is broad
enough to extend the Corps' jurisdiction to local waters which may
provide habitat to migratory birds and endangered species."1 48 The
court reached its decision by referencing Hoffman Homes, in which
the Seventh Circuit set forth the correlation between interstate
commerce and the regulation of wetlands. 149 Relying on Hoffman
Homes, the court rejected Cargill's claim, finding instead that the
regulation of migratory bird habitats falls within interstate com-
merce.1 50 The court in Hoffman Homes noted that "[t]hroughout
North America, millions of people spend more than a billion dol-
144. Leslie Salt IV, 55 F.3d at 1395. The Ninth Circuit explained its analogy to
the Riverside case, noting that "the Corps' rationale for regulating adjacent wet-
lands may have some application to isolated waters as well." Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. The court acknowledged, however, that if it were considering this
issue for first time, it would delve further into the merits of Cargill's claim. Id.
Further analysis was not proper, however, given the standard of review. Id. For a
discussion of the standard of review, see supra note 9.
147. Leslie Salt I, 55 F.3d at 1395. For further discussion of the migratory
bird rule, see supra notes 62-75 and accompanying text.
148. Leslie Salt IV, 55 F.3d at 1395 (quoting Leslie Salt II, 896 F.2d 354, 360 (9th
Cir. 1990)). Furthermore, the court stated that when reviewing congressional acts
under the Commerce Clause, a court should be highly deferential to Congress. Id.
(citing United States v. Evans, 928 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1991)). Additionally, the
court asserted that "[a]ctivity that is seemingly insignificant may be regulated
[under the Commerce Clause] where one individual's 'contribution, taken to-
gether with that of many others similarly situated, is far from trivial.'" Id. (quoting
Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 127-28 (1942)).
149. For further discussion of Hoffman Homes, see supra notes 69-74 and ac-
companying text.
150. Leslie Salt IV, 55 F.3d at 1395-96.
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lars annually on hunting, trapping and observing migratory birds.
The cumulative loss of wetlands, however, has reduced populations
of many bird species, limiting the ability of people to hunt, trap and
observe these birds."1 51
The Ninth Circuit continued, citing the Supreme Court's hold-
ing in Hughes v. Oklahoma.152 In Hughes, the Court asserted that
state regulation of intrastate wildlife fell within the scope of the dor-
mant Commerce Clause.1 53 The Ninth Circuit interpreted the
Hughes decision as extending Congress's Commerce Clause powers
to the regulation of migratory birds.154
On the basis of the above analysis, the second panel of the
Ninth Circuit conceded that the migratory bird rule does test the
limits of the Commerce Clause and, arguably, the bounds of rea-
son.155 In light of the broad sweep of the Commerce Clause, how-
ever, the court held that the first panel's holding was not clearly
erroneous and, thus, would not be revisited.1
V. CRiTicAL ANALYSIS
The second panel of the Ninth Circuit correctly found that the
migratory bird rule was reasonably within the meaning of the CWA.
Nonetheless, it was clearly erroneous for the Leslie Salt II court to
qualify the regulations as merely interpretive.1 57 The migratory
bird rule exceeds Congress's Commerce Clause power. While a
151. Id. (quoting Hoffman Homes, Inc. v. EPA, 999 F.2d 256, 261 (7th Cir.
1993)).
152. 441 U.S. 322 (1979).
153. Leslie Salt IV, 55 F.3d at 1396 (citing Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322,
329-36 (1979)).
154. Id. Additionally, the court used other cases to support its contention
that the Commerce Clause extends to the migratory bird rule. Id. In Palila v.
Hawaii Dep't of Land & Natural Resources, 471 F. Supp. 985 (D. Haw. 1979), aff'd,
639 F.2d 495 (9th Cir. 1981), the Ninth Circuit found that a national program to
protect wildlife preserves the possibility of interstate commerce in observing these
animals. Id. at 995.
155. Leslie Salt I, 55 F.3d at 1390. Specifically, the court noted that there is
no evidence of any human contact with the ponds on Cargill's property. Id.
156. Id. After the Ninth Circuit determined that these past issues would not
be revisited, there was a concurrence on non-related issues. Id. at 1396-97. The
two concurring judges affirmed the holding in Leslie Salt II that civil penalties are
mandatory under CWA section 309(d). Id.
157. Because the Leslie Salt Icourt was dearly erroneous in determining that
regulations were interpretive, the Leslie Salt IVcourt should have revisited the issue.
For a discussion of why the rules were interpretive, see infra notes 159-77.
1997]
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nexus exists between migratory birds and interstate commerce, it is
not close enough to justify a grant of jurisdiction. 158
A. The Corps' Regulations Constitute Substantive Rules
Substantive rules are intended to "grant rights, impose obliga-
tions, or produce other significant effects on public interests
.... -159 Admittedly, determining whether a rule is interpretive or
substantive is often a difficult task. 160 In Tabb Lakes, the court noted
"courts generally differentiate cases 'in which an agency is merely
explicating Congress' [s] desires from those cases in which the
agency is adding substantive content of its own." 161 Furthermore,
interpretive rules should be "only [narrowly and] reluctantly
countenanced."'162
The migratory bird rule163 has a "substantial effect on the pub-
lic interest" because its content creates a nexus with interstate com-
merce, facilitating the Corps' jurisdiction over isolated waters.'"
The Corps asserted jurisdiction over Cargill's private property on
the basis of its regulations. 65 The ponds on the property were con-
sidered "waters of the United States" in that they were "water[s]
which [are] used or could be used as habitat for other migratory
birds."166 Because the property does not fall within any definition
contained in the CWA, without this distinction in its regulations the
Corps has no basis for concluding the property qualifies as a "water
158. For a discussion of how an action must substantially affect interstate com-
merce in order to be regulated under the Commerce Clause, see infra notes 189-
205 and accompanying text.
159. Tabb Lakes, Ltd. v. United States, 715 F. Supp. 726, 728 (E.D. Va. 1988),
aff'd, 885 F.2d 866 (4th Cir. 1989).
160. Id. (citing American Hosp. Ass'n v. Bowen, 640 F. Supp. 453 (D.D.C.
1986), rev'd, 834 F.2d 1037, 1045 (D.C. Cir. 1987)) (stating distinction between
substantive and interpretive rules is gray).
161. Id. at 728 (quoting American Hosp. Ass'n, 834 F.2d at 1045).
162. Id. at 728. For further discussion of Tabb Lakes, see supra notes 62-65 and
accompanying text.
163. See Tabb Lakes, 715 F. Supp. at 728 (concluding memorandum "affected a
change in Corps policy intended to have the full force and effect of a substantive
rule").
164. Id. Substantive content is a standard which indicates a sufficient nexus
to interstate commerce to warrant exercise of jurisdiction by Corps over isolated
waters. See Leslie Salt 1, 700 F. Supp. 476, 481-82 (N.D. Cal. 1988), rev'd, 896 F.2d
354 (9th Cir. 1990) (illustrating how regulations have effect on public interest).
165. Leslie Salt 1, 700 F. Supp. at 482. The court stated that the Corps asserted
jurisdiction under several subsections of its regulations. Id.
166. Id. The Ninth Circuit found that the water was used as habitat for migra-
tory birds, and this alone would be sufficient to establish jurisdiction. Id.
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of the United States." 167 If these regulations are interpretive, the
Corps could use the preamble only as an aid, and not as a basis for
asserting jurisdiction. 16 8 In the present case, however, the pream-
ble was the sole basis used for asserting jurisdiction. 169 Because the
Corps relies on the preamble as its source of power for asserting
jurisdiction over private property, the language of the preamble has
a substantial effect on the public interest.
Additionally, the Corps promulgated this rule in order to add
substantive content to the CWA. 170 In a memorandum, the Deputy
Director of the Corps stated that the migratory bird regulation
"clarified for the first time the factors which are indicative of a con-
nection to interstate commerce for purposes of the CWA."171 The
memorandum further stated that "effective immediately, all
waterbodies which are or reasonably could be used by migratory
birds are waters of the United States . -. 72 The affirmative state-
ment in the memorandum asserting that these waterbodies "are 'wa-
ters of the United States'" accentuates the fact that this rule was
substantive, and not merely interpretive. 173 The migratory bird
rule did not intend to "explain existing law" like an interpretive
rule, rather, it intended to "effect a change in existing law" like a
substantive rule.174 The rule, therefore, provided another means
167. For a list of types of waters over which Corps can assert jurisdiction, see
supra note 53. The only definition which Cargill's property falls under is found in
33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(3)(i) which states that waters can be those "[w]hich are or
could be used by interstate or foreign travelers for recreational or other purposes."
Navigation and Navigable Waters, 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a) (3) (i) (1996). The Corps
set forth the migratory bird rule pursuant to this subsection. See Leslie Salt IV, 55
F.3d 1388, 1394 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied sub nom. Cargill, Inc., v. United States,
116 S. Ct. 407 (1995) (explaining Corps' rationale for interpreting Act as granting
jurisdiction). Cargill's property does not meet the terms of any other definition.
Id.
168. See Tabb Lakes, 715 F. Supp. at 728. If these rules were merely interpre-
tive, they would be "instructional" rather than determinative. Id.
169. See Leslie Salt IV, 55 F.3d at 1388. In Tabb Lakes, the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Virginia stated that in a situation identical to Car-
gill's, "the Corps relied on the memorandum [regulations] in reaching its jurisdic-
tion determination." Tabb Lakes, 715 F. Supp. at 728.
170. See Tabb Lakes, 715 F. Supp. at 728 (stating memorandum affected a
change in Corps policy intending to have full force and effect of substantive rule).
171. Id.
172. Id. (emphasis added).
173. See Tabb Lakes, 715 F. Supp. at 728. The use of the terminology "are wa-
ters of the United States" as opposed to "may be waters of the United States" shows
the Corps' intent that the rule be determinative, not just instructional. Id. (em-
phasis added.) As the Tabb Lakes court stated, the change in the Corps policy was
"intended to have the full force and effect of a substantive rule." Id.
174. See id. See also American Hosp. Ass'n v. Bowen, 834 F.2d 1037, 1046 (D.C.
Cir. 1987) (holding that typical example of substantive rule was use by parole
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by which the Corps could assert jurisdiction. 175 Consequently, the
migratory bird rule should be considered a substantive rule and
deemed void for failing to comply with the notice and comment
requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act. 176 This would
effectively strip the Corps' basis for asserting jurisdiction over the
Cargill property.1 77 The Ninth Circuit erred in finding the regula-
tion merely interpretive. Rather, the court should have found the
Leslie Salt II court's determination clearly erroneous and revisited
the issue.
B. The Leslie Salt IV Court was Reasonable in Upholding the
Migratory Bird Rule
Contrary to Cargill's contention in Leslie Salt II, the court prop-
erly upheld the reasonableness of the migratory bird rule.178 In its
analysis, the Ninth Circuit looked to the CWA's policy objectives
and legislative history in determining whether Congress intended
the CWA to have a scope broad enough to encompass the migra-
tory bird rule. 179
The CWA's legislative history expresses Congressional intent
that the term "navigable waters" be given the broadest meaning
constitutionally permissible.180 Case law further supports this con-
tention.18' In Stoeco Development, Ltd. v. Department of the Army Corps
board of guidelines that established crucial factors in determining parole eligibility
and thus were critical to parole decision). The Corps regulations can be analo-
gized to the parole guidelines in that both are crucial in determining whether a
certain standard has been met. See id.
175. See Tabb Lakes, 715 F. Supp. at 729 (stating memorandum intended to be
binding and to take effect immediately).
176. See id In Tabb Lakes the court determined that because the regulations
were substantive, yet not subject to notice and comment, it must "set aside any
agency action found to be without observance of procedure required by law." Id.
(citing 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(D) (1994)).
177. See id. (setting aside agency action because memorandum not excepted
from notice and comment requirement).
178. See Leslie Salt I, 55 F.3d 1388, 1394 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied sub nom.
Cargill, Inc. v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 407 (1995) (stating fact that CWA evinces
broad congressional purpose supports Corps' interpretation).
179. Id., For a discussion of the court's analysis of the CWA's policy objectives
and legislative history, see supra notes 134-46 and accompanying text.
180. H.R. REP. No. 92-911 (1972); S. REP. No. 92-1236 (1972) reprinted in 1972
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3776, 3833. For a discussion on the interpretation of "navigable wa-
ters," see supra notes 52-58 and accompanying text.
181. See United States v. Akers, 651 F. Supp. 320, 322 (E.D. Cal. 1987) (stating
Congress intended waters to be defined as broadly as possible in order to provide
the environment with maximum degree of protection possible); United States v.
Ciampitti, 583 F. Supp. 483, 491 (D.N.J. 1984) (stating term "navigable waters" not
limited to traditional tests of navigability); National Resources Defense Council v.
Callaway, 392 F. Supp. 685, 686 (D.D.C. 1975) (stating broad definition of "water
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of Engineers,'8 2 the District Court for the District of NewJersey inter-
preted the CWA's legislative history as indicating that "Congress in-
tended the CWA to assert 'federal jurisdiction over the nation's
waters to the maximum extent permissible under the Commerce
Clause of the Constitution.'" 183
Additionally, Congress specifically set forth a statement of legis-
lative purpose, within the CWA, supporting a broad interpretation
of its jurisdictional scope.' 84 Congress stated that its goals were not
only to protect the nation's waters but also its wildlife.185 These
broad, encompassing purposes support the conclusion that Con-
gress intended a capacious reading of the Act's scope.' 8 6 Thus, in
considering both the legislative history and the statutory language
of the CWA, the Ninth Circuit correctly determined that the Leslie
Salt II court was not erroneous in finding the migratory bird rule
consistent with the CWA's direction and purpose.' 8 7
C. The Migratory Bird Rule Exceeds Congress's Commerce
Clause Powers
The Leslie Salt IV court improperly reaffirmed the first panel of
the Ninth Circuit's holding that "[t]he Commerce Clause power...
of the United States" intends assertion ofjurisdiction to maximum extent of Com-
merce Clause); Quivera Mining Co. v. EPA, 765 F.2d 126, 129-30 (10th Cir. 1985)
(noting Congress intended to regulate discharges affecting interstate commerce in
any way); United States v. Tull, 769 F.2d 182, 184 (4th Cir. 1985), rev'd in part, 481
U.S. 412 (1987) (stating Congress intended broadest possible constitutional inter-
pretation). For a discussion of case law supporting the contention that the scope
of the CWA should be broad, see supra notes 141-45 and accompanying text.
182. 701 F. Supp. 1075 (D.N.J. 1988). For a discussion of Stoeco, see supra
note 55.
183. 1d. (quoting United States v. Ciampitti, 583 F. Supp. 483, 491 (D.N.J.
1984) (quoting National Resources Defense Council v. Callaway, 392 F. Supp. 685,
686 (D.D.C. 1975))).
184. See infra text accompanying notes 185-86.
185. CWA § 101(a)(2), 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2) (1994). In its entirety, the
subsection states that "it is the national goal that wherever attainable, an interim
goal of water quality which provides for the protection and propagation of fish,
shellfish, and wildlife and provides for recreation in and on the water be achieved
byJuly 1, 1983." Id.
186. For support that Congress intended a broad scope for the CWA, see
supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text. The Supreme Court also seems to have
adopted this viewpoint. In United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S.
121, 131-35 (1985), the Court determined that it was reasonable for the Corps to
assert jurisdiction over adjacent wetlands. Id. By determining that adjacent wet-
lands may be considered "waters," the Court embraced a very broad interpretation
of the term "waters." See id. It reasonably follows that the Court has determined
that the scope of the CWA should be broad. See id.
187. For an analysis of why the Leslie Salt H court was not erroneous in hold-
ing that the migratory bird rule is reasonable under the CWA, see supra notes 178-
87 and accompanying text.
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is broad enough to extend the Corps['] jurisdiction to local waters
which may provide habitat to migratory birds and endangered spe-
cies." 188 In so holding, the Ninth Circuit overextended the reach of
Congress's Commerce Clause powers. In order for the Corps to
assert jurisdiction it must show the subject property either involves
or substantially affects interstate commerce.1 89 As the second panel
of the Ninth Circuit noted, the Leslie Salt HI court used the migra-
tory bird rule to satisfy this requirement, thus creating a nexus be-
tween the Newark Coyote property and interstate commerce. 190
Noting people cross state lines to observe, watch and hunt these
birds, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the destruction of wetlands
could hinder interstate travel.191 Thus, the Ninth Circuit ruled that
the protection of the migratory birds' habitat is within Congress's
domain.1 92 This holding, however, was erroneous because while
migratory birds may have some incidental effect on interstate com-
merce, they do not have the "substantial effect" required by the
Supreme Court's decisions in Wickard93 and Hodel.'94
In the present case, the Corps presented only a tenuous argu-
ment that the potential use by migratory birds can substantially af-
fect interstate commerce. 195 Realistically, the effects on interstate
commerce would be minimal.1 96 The Leslie Salt II and Leslie Salt IV
courts never actually addressed how migratory birds would substan-
188. Leslie Salt IV, 55 F.3d 1388, 1395 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied sub nom.
Cargill, Inc. v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 407 (1995) (quoting Leslie Salt II, 896 F.2d
354, 360 (9th Cir. 1990)).
189. See Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264
(1981) (holding that activity must substantially affect interstate commerce for Con-
gress to regulate activity). For a discussion of Hode4 see supra notes 42-45 and
accompanying text.
190. See Leslie Salt IV, 55 F.3d at 1392 (discussing how first panel of Ninth
Circuit created nexus between isolated ponds and interstate commerce where wa-
ters may provide habitat for migratory birds).
191. Id. (citing Hoffman Homes, Inc. v. EPA, 999 F.2d 256, 261 (7th Cir.
1993)).
192. Id. at 1394. The court noted "the Act's policy of protecting wildlife
could plausibly be read to stretch this far." Id.
193. For a discussion of Wikard, see supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
194. For a discussion of Hodel, see supra notes 42-45 and accompanying text.
For a discussion of the "substantial effect" test, see supra notes 44-47 and accompa-
nying text.
195. See Leslie Salt IV, 55 F.3d at 1394-96. Nothing in the CWA or its legislative
history demonstrates a correlation between migratory birds and interstate com-
merce. See CWA § 101, 33 U.S.C. § 1251; H.R. REP. No. 911, 92d Cong., 2d sess.
131 (1972); S. REP. No. 1236, 92d Cong., 2d sess. 144 (1972), reprinted in 1972
U.S.C.CA.N. 3776, 3833.
196. See Leman, supra note 35, at nn. 175-82. Even if the effects of migratory
birds were shown to be more than minimal, no documentation exists which raises
it to the level of "substantially affecting" it. See Hoffman Homes, Inc. v. EPA, 999
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tially affect interstate commerce. 197 Rather, the courts merely of-
fered the possibility that interstate travelers could be affected. 198
This remote possibility, however, should not be determinative of
whether migratory birds substantially affect interstate commerce. 199
The Supreme Court must set a limit on the amount of power
Congress has to invade individual rights and infringe on personal
property.200 If the Court determines that the migratory bird rule
"substantially affects" interstate commerce, where will the limit
be?20 1 In Wickard and Hodel, the Court found substantiality as the
crucial factor in limiting Congress's Commerce Clause power.202
F.2d 256, 259 (7th Cir. 1993) (stating mere possibility of migratory bird use insuffi-
cient to rely on Commerce Clause in applying CWA).
197. See Leslie Salt IV, 55 F.3d at 1394-96.
198. For a description of the possibility of migratory bird use, see supra text
accompanying note 151.
199. The court in Tabb Lakes commented that it had "grave doubts that a
property now so used, or seen as an expectant habitat for some migratory birds,
can be declared to be such a nexus to interstate commerce as to warrant... Corps
jurisdiction." Tabb Lakes Ltd. v. United States, 715 F. Supp. 726, 729 (E.D. Va.
1988), aff'd, 885 F.2d 866 (4th Cir. 1989).
200. Leman, supra note 35, at 1266 (citing NLRB v. Jones & McLaughlin Steel
Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937)). Matters would be different if isolated wetlands were
mentioned in the language of the CWA or in the legislative history. In Hodel, the
Supreme Court found that the effect on interstate commerce was minuscule. Ho-
del v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 277-80 (1981).
The court, however, deferred to congressional findings which showed Congress
explicitly found the activity to have a substantial effect on interstate commerce. Id.
In Leslie Salt I, however, the court never mentioned congressional findings re-
garding the migratory bird rule and its potential effect on interstate commerce.
See Leslie Salt IV, 55 F.3d at 1395. See also S. REP. No. 92-1236 (1972), reprinted in
1972 U.S.C.CA.N. 3776, 3822 (evidencing lack of discussion of migratory bird
rule's impact on interstate commerce).
The difference between rules and statutes where Congress has made formal or
informal findings of an activity's substantial effect on interstate commerce and
those which have no congressional findings is large. See Katzenbach v. McClung,
379 U.S. 314,299-300 (1964). When congressional findings explain how an activity
substantially affects interstate commerce, the Supreme Court has never invalidated
legislation on the basis that it extends beyond the scope of Congress's commerce
powers. Leman, supra note 35, at n.163. Without these congressional findings, the
Supreme Court has stated that "in cases where the substantial effect is tenuous or
difficult to perceive, the absence of such findings could result in the invalidation
of a law ." Lopez v. United States, 2 F.3d 1342, 1363-64 (5th Cir. 1993), affd, 115 S.
Ct. 1624 (1995).
201. The Ninth Circuit recognized as much when it stated: "[t]he migratory
bird rule certainly tests the limits of Congress['s] commerce powers and, some
would argue, the bounds of reason." Leslie Salt IV, 55 F.3d at 1396.
202. For a discussion of Hodel, see supra notes 42-45 and accompanying text.
For a discussion of Wickard, see supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text. In Lopez,
the Court determined that the Commerce Clause basis for legislating must be lim-
ited to activities that "substantially affect" interstate commerce. See Lopez, 2 F.3d at
1362. The Court argued that without this threshold, the existence of intrastate
commerce would be threatened. Id.
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By finding that migratory birds substantially affect interstate com-
merce, the Ninth Circuit failed the Supreme Court's test, thus, tran-
scending the limits of reason.203
Because the court never addressed the dispositive issue of
whether the activity substantially affected interstate commerce, the
Leslie Salt IV court's decision to validate the migratory bird rule
under the Commerce Clause was clearly erroneous.20 4 By finding
the migratory bird rule permissible under the Constitution without
any proof that migratory birds could substantially affect interstate
commerce, the court disregarded the restraints of the Commerce
Clause.205
VI. IMPACT: THE CWA's SEEMINGLY LIMITLEss BOUNDARIES
The impact of Leslie Salt IVis potentially great. Leslie Salt IVwas
the first federal decision to specifically address the CWA, the Com-
merce Clause and isolated waters.20 6 Effectively, the Ninth Circuit's
decision gives Congress and the Corps unlimited jurisdiction under
the CWA.20 7 By granting jurisdiction to the Corps over man-made,
isolated, seasonal waters, the Ninth Circuit gives a broad interpreta-
tion to the Commerce Clause. 208 As a result, the Leslie Salt IV court
strips state-given and personal property rights in the name of the
environment.209
While the outcome may be virtuous in that it benefits the envi-
ronment, granting such power to the federal government so freely
203. See Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264
(1981) (setting forth test for finding whether action substantially affects interstate
commerce). For a discussion on why it is doubtful that migratory birds "substan-
tially affect" interstate commerce, see supra notes 188-99 and accompanying text.
204. See Leslie Salt IV, 55 F.3d at 1395-96.
205. For a discussion on why the migratory bird rule is not constitutionally
permissible, see supra notes 188-205 and accompanying text.
206. Leman, supra note 35, at 1256.
207. For a discussion of why this holding gives the Corps virtually unlimited
jurisdiction in the Ninth Circuit, see supra notes 200-03 and accompanying text.
208. The Ninth Circuit could have required a human activity component in
order for the activity to fall under the Commerce Clause. See Hoffman Homes,
Inc. v. EPA, 99 F.2d 256, 259 (7th Cir. 1993). This option would have required
that federal regulations could only apply to those "waters" that have an actual eco-
nomic connection to interstate commerce. Id. A second option would have been
to limit the applicability of the migratory bird rule to those "waters" which are
actually used by migratory birds, not just potentially used. Id.
209. See Hoffman Homes, 99 F.2d at 262 (stating there is no need to "interfere
with private ownership based on what appears to be no more than a well inten-
tioned effort ... to expand government control beyond reasonable or practical
limits").
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is disturbing.210 The Commerce Clause has been stretched beyond
the bounds of reason in order to create the crucial nexus between
interstate commerce and the regulated activity needed to acquire
CWA jurisdiction.211 The purpose of the CWA is to protect and
restore the purity of our nation's waters, but this purpose should
not be achieved at the expense of the Commerce Clause's
integrity.2 12
Courts must begin to limit the federal government's power
over the regulation of privately owned waters.213 Hopefully, other
courts will realize the repercussions of granting virtually unlimited
power to the federal government, disregard precedent and rule ac-
cordingly. If the danger is not realized and other circuit courts fol-
low the Ninth Circuit's lead, our nation could be headed to a time
when the Commerce Clause has little meaning and the powers of
the federal government are seemingly limitless. 214
Marni A. Gelb
210. The regulation of wildlife is a function traditionally allocated to the state.
Jack R. Nelson, Palila v. Hawaii Department Of Land and Natural Resources: State Gov-
ernments Fall Prey to the Endangered Species Act of 1973, 10 ECOLOGY L.Q. 2 (1982).
However, in its allowance of Corps jurisdiction over an activity which arguably does
not affect interstate commerce, "the Leslie Salt approach [did] not allow for judicial
limits on the use of the Commerce Clause [and] expand[ed] federal power at the
expense of the states." Leman, supra note 35, at 1205.
211. See Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, Inc., U.S. 264
(1981) (Rehnquist, J. concurring) (contending Court's upholding of federal rela-
tion of surface mining practices stretched Commerce Clause to "nth degree"). All
activities have at least a theoretical effect on interstate commerce. Leman, supra
note 35, at 1265 (citing United States v. Lopez, 2 F.2d 1342 (5th Cir. 1993) aff'd,
115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995)). Nevertheless, it is the task of the courts to enforce and
apply limitations on what constitutes actual interstate commerce. Id. at 1265.
212. See CWA § 101, U.S.C. § 1251 (1994) (providing no language regarding
man-made, isolated wetlands). For a discussion of ways to protect the environment
without disrupting the distinction between local and federal government and
Commerce Clause integrity, see supra note 208.
213. The effects of the Leslie Salt holdings on private landowners are also far-
reaching and invasive. Larry R. Bianucci & Rew R. Goodenow, The Impact of Section
404 of the Clean Water Act on Agricultural Land Use, 10 U.C.L.A.J. ENVrL. L. & POL'Y
41, 65 (1991). After Leslie Salt the productive activities of a land owner on his own
land can potentially be chilled by an activity which has a negligible effect on both
interstate commerce and water quality. Id. at 51. As one commentator notes, "the
varying interpretations of the CWA could create nightmares for landowners." Id.
at 65.
214. The breadth of Leslie Salt is illustrated in the "Glancing Duck" theory.
Bianucci, supra note 213, at 65. The theory is as follows: A duck, while flying over
land, looks down to the ground and notices stagnant water, or even saturated
ground. Id. The duck then contemplates landing in that area. Id. According to
Leslie Salt the duck's glance at these isolated waters would affect interstate com-
merce substantially enough to warrant Corps jurisdiction under the Commerce
Clause. Id. If this scenario seems unlikely in its Commerce Clause implications, it
is not. Indeed, it has become the practice of the Corps to not even "consider
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interstate commerce as a possible restriction to regulation." William L. Want, LAw
OF WETLANDS REGULATION § 4.05[1] 4-14 (1990). Lawsuits have been instituted on
the grounds that the Corps' practice of restricting jurisdiction over certain wet-
lands due to a lack of effect on interstate commerce was illegal. See National Wild-
life Fed'n v. Laubscher, 662 F. Supp. 548 (S.D. Tex. 1987). The issue of whether
the Corps rightfully exercises jurisdiction over isolated wetlands having little or no
effect on interstate commerce is merely a "dead letter." Bianucci, supra note 213,
at 47.
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